文章摘要
蒯因“去引号论”与真之减缩论
Quinean Disquotationalism and Deflationism about Truth
  
DOI:
中文关键词: 真理论  去引号论  减缩论  等值模式
英文关键词: theories of truth  disquotationalism  deflationism  equivalence schema
基金项目:江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目(CXZZ13_0003)
作者单位
王洪光 南京大学 哲学系/现代逻辑与逻辑应用研究所江苏 南京 210023 
摘要点击次数: 1090
全文下载次数: 1058
中文摘要:
      蒯因的“去引号论”被戴维森作为与冗余论等相并列的一种真之减缩论加以批评。戴维森基于塔斯基对“真”所做的工作,认为所有沿着减缩论进路发展的真理论都没能把握“真”这个概念的实质。然而,尽管蒯因的去引号论的确与塔斯基的工作紧密相关,但是其比塔斯基的真之模式(TS)断言更多,而且其“真”概念具有经验性的内容。减缩论的核心应当是承认等值模式(ES)的基底性,而非仅承认等值模式自身。根据对减缩论的进一步考察与比较分析可以表明,蒯因的去引号论并不是一种减缩论。
英文摘要:
      Quinean disquotationalism is criticized by Davidson together with other deflationary theories including the redundancy views. Appealing to Tarski’s work on truth, Davidson thinks that all theories following deflationary approach could not catch the nature of truth. Although Quinean disquotationalism is closely related to Tarski’s work and usually methodologically regarded as a kind of deflationary theory, Quine tells more than Tarski’s Truth Schema (TS). Moreover, Quine’s concept of truth embodies empirical content. The endorsement of the fundamentality of Equivalence Schema (ES), instead of only (ES), should be taken as the heart of deflationism. Therefore, Quinean disquotationalism is not a version of deflationism in the light of a deflated account of deflationism.
查看全文   查看/发表评论  下载PDF阅读器
关闭