文章摘要
政策引导下企业跨区域迁移的演化博弈分析
An Evolutionary Games Analysis of Enterprise Cross-regionalMigration under Policy Guidance
  
DOI:
中文关键词: 业迁移  政策引导  演化博弈  演化稳定策略
英文关键词: enterprise migration  policy guidance  evolutionary games  evolutionary stable strategy
基金项目:国家社科基金重大招标项目(11&ZD043);国家社科基金青年项目(10CJY035);国家自科基金青年项目(41201592);教育部人文社科青年项目(13YJC790224、12YJC790111);湖南省社科基金一般项目(11YBA126)
作者单位
周华蓉,贺胜兵 湖南科技大学 商学院湖南 湘潭 411201 
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中文摘要:
      采用演化博弈模型研究政策引导下的企业跨区域迁移行为,分析承接地政府和迁移企业的演化稳定策略(ESS)。模型结果表明,迁移后获得持续增加的盈利空间、企业迁移成本、承接地政府的优惠政策以及迁出地和承接地环境规制力度的差别是影响企业迁移的重要因素;在不同的情境模式下,影响不同类型企业跨区域迁移行为的关键因素存在明显差异。在演化博弈分析的基础上,进而提出促进沿海企业向我国中西部地区有序迁移的政策建议。
英文摘要:
      This paper establishes an evolutionary game model to analyze the firm migration promoted by policy guidance, and probes the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) between the undertaking governments and migrating enterprises. Results show that, firstly, the increasing profit margins obtained after migration, firm migration costs, undertaking governments incentives, and the environmental regulation differences between emigration and undertaking regions are important factors affecting firm migration; secondly, the key factors of migration among different types of enterprises exist obvious differences in different situations. Furthermore, this paper suggestions that the enterprises, which have lost comparative advantages in coastal areas, may orderly migrate to the Midwest areas of China.
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