文章摘要
“本体论证明”的三个模态版本辨析
A Comparative Study on Three Modal Versions of “Ontological Argument”
  
DOI:
中文关键词: 本体论证明  模态版本  逻辑可能  形而上学可能
英文关键词: Ontological Argument  Modal versions  Logical Possibility  Metaphysical Possibility
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中文摘要:
      安瑟尔姆提出的关于上帝存在的"本体论证明",曾受到康德的摧毁性批判。以现代模态逻辑为基本工具,哈特肖恩、普兰丁格和哥德尔分别构造了本体论证明的"模态版本"。经过比较研究可以发现:哈特肖恩的版本没有区分逻辑可能与形而上学可能;普兰丁格的版本以"极伟大性"为核心,运用可能世界理论摆脱了基于"存在"不是谓词的康德式质疑,使问题集中于对证明中非逻辑前提之合理性的把握;而哥德尔的版本尽管依托"肯定性属性",但由于把"必然存在"作为"肯定性属性"之一,最终难以避免康德式质疑。更重要的是,任何本体论证明都是一种有前提的推演,因此对它们的评价最终都要依赖于其非逻辑前提的合理性。
英文摘要:
      It was Anselm that first formulated an argument for existence of God,and then I.Kant made a famous objection that existence is not a proper predicate.In terms of modal logic,C.Hartshorne,A.Plantinga and K.Gdel constructed their own modal versions.This paper is an attempt to contrast those versions.Hartshorne didn’t distinguish logical possibility from metaphysical possibility;Plantinga employed his modest modal theory and developed a version which can avoid Kant’s criticism,and this further shows that the real concern about ontological argument is premises;Gdel’s version suggests that "necessary existence" is one of positive properties,and therefore can also be challenged by Kant.Above all,there is no ontological argument without premises,so the necessary step for further study is to give a good account for its premises.
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