文章摘要
基于KMRW声誉模型的政府预算合同博弈研究
On Game of Governmental Budget Contracts Based on KMRW Reputation Model
  
DOI:
中文关键词: 声誉模型  信号博弈  预算合同  交易费用
英文关键词: reputation model  signal game  budget contract  transaction cost
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71072079);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(10YJA790208)
作者单位
胡振华,卿智群 中南大学 商学院湖南 长沙 410011 
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中文摘要:
      政府预算部门,通过争取有限预算资源的种种努力,换取政府预算部门的相应资金配给,这个过程中会发生各种交易费用。基于KMRW声誉模型,在假设政府建立了奖惩机制的基础上,对预算部门之间展开预算合同博弈分析,分析结果表明只要重复的次数是有限的,唯一的博弈精练纳什均衡就是每个参与人在三次博弈后选择如实申报的纳什均衡战略,因此,政府要创造利于声誉博弈的环境,促进预算部门守信,降低预算合同成本。
英文摘要:
      The government budget departments, through the efforts of competing for the limited budget resources, get in return the corresponding fund rations from the governmental budget departments, the process of which will bring forth a variety of transaction costs. Based on the assumption that the government has established the mechanism of rewards and punishments, this paper uses the KMRW reputation model to analyze the game of budget contracts among the governmental budget departments. It shows that as long as the number of repetitions is limited, the only game refined Nash equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium strategy truthfully declared by each participant after three games. Therefore, the government shall create a favorable environment for the reputation of the game, and promote the budget departments to keep faith and maintain good reputation, so as to reduce the contract costs.
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